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


Washington, D.C. 20505

13 AUG 1987

July 1987

International Narcotics Situation Report #3




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DATE: JUL 2004

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## PERSPECTIVE

### VIOLENCE: CATALYST FOR DRUG CONTROL?

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Peruvian drug organizations now exercise virtual sovereignty over many towns in Peru's remote Huallaga Valley, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Trafficker strongholds bring with them an overall increase in criminal violence, fueled by competition for the immense profits associated with the drug trade.

[REDACTED]

Occasionally, organizations fight one another in turf wars and for shares of the drug trade, and increasingly they are battling police and military units. Violence is also used routinely against local officials and citizens opposed to the drug trade. [REDACTED]

Drug organizations in other Latin American countries are well-positioned to follow the Peruvian and Colombian models. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

We believe some governments may feel compelled to step up actions against trafficker violence, especially if it extends beyond narcotics strongholds and threatens economic, political, or security interests. In our view, the desire to quell violence in trafficker enclaves is becoming a more pressing objective than drug control itself. Governments are, however, increasingly beginning to realize that this objective is unreachable without

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striking at the root of the problem. We believe this realization influenced [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Peruvian President Garcia's decision to move ahead with Peru's most ambitious interdiction operation to date in the Huallaga Valley. Although the odds weigh heavily against the lasting success of such operations, they generally force traffickers to lie low and, more importantly, help focus the public's attention on the narcotics problem. [REDACTED]

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FEATURE ARTICLE

PERU: PROSPECTS FOR NARCOTICS CONTROL

Peruvian antidrug efforts over the past two years have made little impact on the country's burgeoning illegal drug industry despite President Garcia's public antinarcotics commitment and his general cooperation with US-sponsored enforcement efforts. Mounting economic and security problems, the limited number of available security force personnel, and the relative isolation from Lima of the Huallaga Valley--the largest coca growing area in Peru--all conspire to hinder the government's drug enforcement effort. As a result, Peru has become the world's leading producer of coca leaf. [REDACTED]

The Huallaga Coca Industry

Peru has emerged during the past several years as the leading producer and exporter of coca leaf and intermediate coca products. Peru has more land--approximately 106,000 hectares--under coca cultivation than all other South American countries combined and produces about two-thirds of the total South American coca crop. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Coca cultivation has replaced nearly all legitimate agriculture, and the coca industry has become the dominant employer. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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
Government Counternarcotics Efforts

The Garcia Government has carried out several counternarcotics operations during its first two years, but it has failed to break trafficker control of the Huallaga Valley. The government has devoted most of its efforts in the Valley to manual coca eradication, which has had little impact on the trafficking organizations.

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Coca Production in the Upper Huallaga Valley



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
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

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
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**REGIONAL HIGHLIGHTS**





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
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


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



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
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



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


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



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
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